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THE CONTINUED ILLEGALIZATION OF 
COMPASSION: UNITED STATES v. MILLIS 
AND ITS EFFECTS ON HUMANITARIAN 
WORK WITH THE HOMELESS 
Matthew M. Cummings* 
Abstract: Every year, more cities enact food sharing restrictions that pun-
ish individuals who try to feed the homeless. These laws are often part of a 
general scheme to solve a city’s homelessness problem by making life so 
unbearable for homeless men and women that they will be forced to move 
elsewhere. Humanitarian aid like food sharing, however, is a form of ex-
pressive conduct whereby the speaker communicates to a particular audi-
ence in need that he or she is willing to care for them. Additionally, the 
speaker’s conduct may inform observers about a particular humanitarian 
dilemma or encourage them to become involved. In United States v. Millis, 
the Ninth Circuit failed to recognize an act of humanitarian aid for travel-
ing immigrants as a form of protected speech, thereby opening the door 
to the creation of more harmful and unfair laws that suppress humanitar-
ian aid. 
Introduction 
 In United States v. Millis, Daniel Millis violated a federal environ-
mental regulation—50 C.F.R. § 27.94(a)—by leaving half-gallon bottles 
of water along trails of the Buenos Aires National Wildlife Refuge to 
prevent needless dehydration deaths of migrants trying to cross the 
border from Mexico into the United States.1 He argued that “humani-
                                                                                                                      
 
* Staff Writer, Boston College Third World Law Journal (2010–2011). 
1 See United States v. Millis, 621 F.3d 914, 914–16 (9th Cir. 2010); Disposal of Waste, 50 
C.F.R. § 27.94(a) (2010). In 1997, the Refuge Improvement Act created the National Wild-
life Refuge System in order “to administer a national network of lands and waters for the 
conservation, management, and where appropriate, restoration of the fish, wildlife, and 
plant resources and their habitats within the United States for the benefit of present and 
future generations of Americans.” 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(a)(2) (2006). In administering this 
system, the Secretary of the Interior is required to ensure the purposes of each refuge are 
carried out and to “plan and direct the continued growth of the System in a manner that is 
best designed to accomplish the mission of the System.” Id. § 668dd(a)(4)(C)–(D). In 
accordance with this mandate, the secretary created federal regulations for the disposal of 
waste. See Millis, 621 F.3d at 917–18; 50 C.F.R. § 27.94. The regulation prohibits the follow-
ing conduct: 
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tarian aid is never a crime,” but is that always the case?2 As Millis dem-
onstrates, a regulation clearly designed to protect the environment can 
sometimes unintentionally punish humanitarian efforts.3 Moreover, 
some laws may be less benign than they seem and may actually have 
been passed to prevent humanitarian efforts under the auspices of neu-
tral environmental or public safety regulations.4 This is precisely the 
case in several U.S. cities where food sharing restrictions limit the abil-
ity of individuals and charities to give food to the homeless.5 These laws 
are disguised as regulations to prevent littering or provide for public 
safety and order but in many cases, they evince “an open hostility” to 
homeless and indigent populations.6 
                                                                                                                      
The littering, disposing, or dumping in any manner of garbage, refuse sewage, 
sludge, earth, rocks, or other debris on any national wildlife refuge except at 
points or locations designated by the refuge manager, or the draining or dump-
ing of oil, acids, pesticide wastes, poisons, or any other types of chemical wastes 
in, or otherwise polluting any waters, water holes, streams or other areas within 
any national wildlife refuge . . . . 
50 C.F.R. § 27.94(a). Millis was convicted under this provision for his activities with No 
More Deaths, “an organization that provides humanitarian aid to migrants,” including the 
“placement of water in the desert along frequently traveled routes for unlawful entrants 
into the United States.” Millis, 621 F.3d at 915. 
2 See Millis, 621 F.3d at 916. 
3 See id. at 914–16 (demonstrating, implicitly, that Millis’s interest in preventing dehy-
dration deaths of migrants conflicts with the government’s interest in protecting one of 
the country’s ten most threatened wildlife refuges). 
4 See generally Feeding Intolerance: Prohibitions on Sharing Food with People Experiencing Home-
lessness, Nat’l Law Center on Homelessness & Poverty & Nat’l Coalition for the 
Homeless, 7, 10–17 (Nov. 2007), http://www.nationalhomeless.org/publications/foodshar- 
ing/Food_Sharing.pdf [hereinafter Feeding Intolerance] (providing examples of food sharing 
restrictions that were designed to stop individuals from feeding the homeless). 
5 See id. For the purposes of this Comment, the term “homeless” refers to those persons 
who are “chronically homeless.” See Fact Sheet: Chronic Homelessness, Nat’l Alliance to End 
Homelessness, 1 (Feb. 2010), http://www.endhomelessness.org/files/1623_file_Fact_Sheet_ 
chronic_2_1_2010.pdf. The Department of Housing and Urban Development defines a 
“chronically homeless” person as “an unaccompanied homeless individual with a disabling 
condition who has either been continuously homeless for a year or more, or has at least four 
(4) episodes of homelessness in the past three (3) years.” Id. at 1 n.4. 
6 See Feeding Intolerance, supra note 4, at 7, 10–11 (explaining, for example, that Atlanta’s 
food sharing restrictions were implemented to “clean up the city,” Dallas’s food sharing re-
strictions were imposed for food safety and littering concerns, and Baltimore’s food sharing 
restrictions were enforced for public health reasons); see also D. Matthew Lay, Note, Do Not 
Feed the Homeless: One of the Meanest Cities for the Homeless Unconstitutionally Punishes the So-Called 
“Enablers,” 8 Nev. L.J. 740, 757 (2008) (noting that the “justification for the [Las Vegas food 
sharing] ordinance shifted depending on the circumstances” and the only person to provide 
evidence in support of the ordinance cited largely irrelevant evidence related to “the safety of 
the homeless . . . and the litter attendant to mobile feedings”). 
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 Although the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decided in Millis’s 
favor, this Comment argues that the court’s decision will enable cities to 
drive out homeless populations by creating anti-littering or public safety 
regulations, which will wrongly punish individuals and charities trying 
to provide the homeless with basic human necessities.7 Part I discusses 
the two compelling interests involved in the Millis case and the major-
ity’s unconvincing attempt to protect them. Part II illustrates the chal-
lenges facing homeless individuals as well as the similarities between 
the facts in Millis and the problems facing charitable efforts to help the 
homeless. Part III explains how the Millis decision protects a city’s abil-
ity to enforce food sharing restrictions against individuals and charities 
that try to feed the homeless. Lastly, Part IV argues that the court could 
have protected the two compelling interests in Millis—the govern-
ment’s interest in protecting federal wildlife refuges and Millis’s inter-
est in providing humanitarian aid—by declaring that humanitarian aid 
is a form of speech protected by the First Amendment. 
I. Millis: The Desire to Protect Two Compelling Interests 
 In Millis, the Ninth Circuit faced a difficult decision—the court 
could either uphold a regulation designed to protect the nation’s wild-
life refuges or protect Millis’s right to engage in humanitarian aid.8 In 
the end, the Ninth Circuit reversed the judgment of the district court, 
thereby overturning Millis’s conviction.9 The court based its decision 
on the ambiguity of the regulation Millis violated, however, and not on 
the nature of his conduct.10 The result was an unconvincing majority 
opinion finding that the word “garbage” in 50 C.F.R. § 27.94(a) was 
ambiguous.11 Judge Jay S. Bybee, in dissent, easily refuted this position 
on a variety of grounds.12 
                                                                                                                      
 
7 See Millis, 621 F.3d at 916 n.2. The court’s focus on statutory construction and its 
statements in dicta protecting general littering policies may provide a roadmap for cities to 
codify their anti-homeless ambitions effectively through littering or public safety statutes. 
See Feeding Intolerance, supra note 4, at 10–17. 
8 See United States v. Millis, 621 F.3d 914, 914–16 (9th Cir. 2010). 
9 Id. at 918. 
10 See id.; Disposal of Waste, 50 C.F.R. § 27.94(a) (2010). 
11 See Millis, 621 F.3d at 917. 
12 See id. at 919–24 (Bybee, J., dissenting). Judge Bybee found “no need to invoke the 
rule of lenity” because “[the regulation] can be understood by persons of ordinary intelli-
gence.” Id. at 919. Bybee argued that the majority largely ignored the term “littering” and 
unnecessarily focused on the term “garbage,” despite the fact that Millis’s citation was for 
“littering in a National Wildlife Refuge.” See id. at 920. He argued, “[L]eaving plastic bot-
tles in a wildlife refuge is littering under any ordinary, common meaning of the word.” Id. 
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 Millis left water bottles in the refuge because of his involvement 
with the organization No More Deaths.13 No More Deaths seeks to pre-
vent the unnecessary deaths of illegal immigrants crossing the border 
into the United States by providing them with humanitarian aid.14 In 
2007 alone, because of the sweltering heat and increased California 
border security, 218 migrant bodies were found in the deserts of Pima 
County, Arizona.15 One way the organization attempts to mitigate this 
humanitarian tragedy is to place full bottles of water along frequently 
traveled immigration routes to help curtail dehydration and exposure 
deaths.16 
 On February 22, 2008, Millis and three other No More Deaths vol-
unteers placed bottles of purified water along the trails of the refuge.17 
Leaving water bottles along the trails of the refuge was not a careless act 
of littering, but rather a deliberate humanitarian effort to prevent the 
deaths of migrants.18 Nevertheless, Millis and the three other volun-
teers acted without a permit and a U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service officer 
                                                                                                                      
at 919. Furthermore, even if “garbage” were the key regulatory word, it must be defined as 
“discarded material” because “useless material” is too subjective. See id. at 921–22. 
13 See id. at 915 (majority opinion). 
14 See id.; Carol J. Williams, Conviction in Migrant-Water Case Overturned, L.A. Times, 
Sept. 3, 2010, at AA3; Ashby Jones, Do-Gooder or Polluter? Ninth Circuit Lets Aid Worker Off the 
Hook, Wall St. J. L. Blog (Sept. 3, 2010, 9:45 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2010/09/ 
03/do-gooder-or-polluter-ninth-circuit-lets-aid-worker-off-the-hook. 
15 See Nicole Santa Cruz, Border Deaths Unabated, L.A. Times, Aug. 24, 2010, at A1 (“In 
2007, a record 218 bodies were found in Pima County. This year, the death toll could be 
worse. Already, authorities have recovered the remains of 170 migrants.”). 
16 See Millis, 621 F.3d at 915. According to the organization’s website, “No More Deaths 
is an organization whose mission is to end death and suffering on the U.S./Mexico border 
through civil initiative: the conviction that people of conscience must work openly and in 
community to uphold fundamental human rights.” History and Mission of No More Deaths, 
No More Deaths, http://www.nomoredeaths.org/Information/history-and-mission-of-no-
more-deaths.html (last visited May 8, 2011). When it was established in 2004, No More 
Deaths described its organizational mandate as follows: 
[T]o provide water, food, and medical assistance to migrants walking through 
the Arizona desert; to monitor [U.S.] operations on the border and work to 
change [U.S.] policy to resolve the “war zone” crisis on the border; and to 
bring the plight of migrants to public attention. These goals were imple-
mented by recruiting aid programs as well as supporting already-existing 
ones, by interfaith, humanitarian, peaceful, solidarity-building events, and by 
establishing camps for assistance, outreach and border monitoring. Under 
the No More Deaths umbrella, participating groups—staffed by volunteers—
abided by clear medical and legal protocols and worked in concert to save 
human lives. 
Id. 
17 See Millis, 621 F.3d at 915–16. 
18 See Williams, supra note 14; Jones, supra note 14. 
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issued Millis a citation for “Disposal of Waste” on a national wildlife ref-
uge.19 
 Without question, the government had a legitimate reason to en-
force a strict littering policy.20 The refuge in which Millis was operating 
is located in Pima County, Arizona, near the Mexican border.21 It pro-
vides approximately 118,000 acres of “some of the southwest’s rarest 
habitats for seven endangered species, ten species of concern, and 
many other native plants and wildlife.”22 Unfortunately, the refuge is in 
danger because of a lack of funding and the need for rangers to spend 
eighty to one hundred percent of their time on border control en-
forcement.23 The rangers are simply unable to stop littering, off-road 
vehicle crimes, or other acts capable of destroying the refuge’s fragile 
habitats.24 By 2008, the destruction had become so widespread that the 
Buenos Aires National Wildlife Refuge became one of the ten most im-
periled national wildlife refuges in the country.25 
 It was against this factual backdrop that the Ninth Circuit found in 
Millis’s favor, although the court limited its decision strictly to the word-
ing of 50 C.F.R. § 27.94(a).26 The court reasoned that the term “gar-
bage” within the regulatory scheme was “sufficiently ambiguous . . . that 
the rule of lenity should apply.”27 The rule of lenity “requires courts to 
limit the reach of criminal statutes to the clear import of their text and 
construe any ambiguity against the government.”28 The rule of lenity is 
                                                                                                                      
19 See Millis, 621 F.3d at 914–16. 
20 See Williams, supra note 14; America’s Most Imperiled Refuges: Ten of the Most Vulnerable 
National Wildlife Refuges, Pub. Emp. for Envtl. Responsibility, 11–13 (May 22, 2008) 
[hereinafter America’s Most Imperiled Refuges], http://www.peer.org/docs/nwr/08_22_5_ 
imperiled_refuges_rpt.pdf (listing the Buenos Aires National Wildlife Refuge as one of the 
ten most threatened refuges). 
21 See Millis, 621 F.3d at 919 (Bybee, J., dissenting); Williams, supra note 14; Community 
Profile: Arivaca, Ariz. Department of Commerce, 1 (2009), http://www.azcommerce.com/ 
doclib/commune/arivaca.pdf. 
22 America’s Most Imperiled Refuges, supra note 20, at 11; Buenos Aires National Wildlife Ref-
uge, U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, 3 (Oct. 1999), http://library.fws.gov/refuges/buenos_ 
aires.pdf. One of the endangered species in the refuge is the masked bobwhite quail; the 
Buenos Aires National Wildlife Refuge remains the last habitat for this wild bird within the 
United States. See Millis, 621 F.3d at 915 (majority opinion). 
23 See America’s Most Imperiled Refuges, supra note 20, at 12 (“Problems on the [U.S.]-
Mexican border due to failed U.S. immigration policies are causing great damage to this 
refuge. Since 2006, over 3500 acres [have] been closed to public use, due to border-related 
problems.”). 
24 See id. at 11–12. 
25 Id. at 11. 
26 See Millis, 621 F.3d at 918; Disposal of Waste, 50 C.F.R. § 27.94(a) (2010). 
27 Millis, 621 F.3d at 918. 
28 United States v. Romm, 455 F.3d 990, 1001 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing authorities). 
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applicable “only where ‘after seizing every thing from which aid can be 
derived, the Court is left with an ambiguous statute.’”29 
 The court considered the fact that water bottles have value to some 
people; it also took into account the dictionary definition of “‘garbage’” 
as “‘food waste’” or “‘discarded or useless material’” and the definition 
of “‘discard’” as “‘to get rid of, esp. as useless or unpleasant.’”30 Based 
on its analysis, the court concluded that it was unclear “whether purified 
water in a sealed bottle intended for human consumption meets the 
definition of ‘garbage.’”31 Therefore, the court found the meaning of 
“garbage” in 50 C.F.R. § 27.94(a) ambiguous enough to trigger the rule 
of lenity.32 
 Judge Bybee, however, argued convincingly in his dissent that nei-
ther the intent nor the meaning of a regulation prohibiting littering in a 
wildlife refuge was in any way ambiguous.33 According to Bybee, the ma-
jority overemphasized the term “garbage” when it was clear that the 
regulation intended to forbid the act of “littering.”34 Although they con-
tained purified water, Bybee argued, “The bottles are garbage because 
they are ‘discarded material,’ no matter the bottles’ potential value.”35 
Furthermore, Bybee found that state courts had dismissed claims that 
the terms “litter,” “garbage,” “waste,” or “refuse” were too vague in a 
number of previous cases.36 Bybee’s reasoning is more persuasive and 
                                                                                                                      
 
29 Millis, 621 F.3d at 917 (quoting United States v. Nader, 542 F.3d 713, 721 (9th Cir. 
2008)). 
30 See id. (quoting Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 330, 480 (Frederick 
C. Mish et al. eds., 10th ed. 1996)). 
31 See id. 
32 See id. at 918. 
33 See id. at 919–23 (Bybee, J., dissenting). Judge Bybee stated, “Any item—whether a 
handbill advertising a land auction or a new high definition TV—brought into the wildlife 
refuge without the Service’s permission is litter, whether it has intrinsic value or not. It 
doesn’t belong on the wildlife refuge. The Service couldn’t have been more clear on this.” 
Id. at 921. 
34 See Millis, 621 F.3d at 920 (Bybee, J., dissenting). Millis was cited for “littering in a 
National Wildlife Refuge” and not for dumping garbage. Id. Millis even testified that ref-
uge workers told him that “leaving ‘water jugs on that trail . . . constituted litter,’ and that 
he was ‘going to be cited for littering.’” Id. 
35 See id. at 921–22. Judge Bybee stated that the key feature of garbage was that it had 
been discarded: “The idea that garbage is ‘discarded,’ . . . comports with the everyday, 
common meaning of the term ‘garbage’ and is essential to its definition because it avoids a 
purely subjective inquiry into the material’s usefulness.” See id. at 921; see also N. Ill. Serv. 
Co. v. EPA, 885 N.E.2d 447, 552 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008) (“Whether an item has value has 
no bearing on whether it is discarded.”). 
36 See Millis, 621 F.3d at 923 n.6 (Bybee, J., dissenting); see also State v. Clayton, 492 So. 
2d 665, 666–67 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986); Sliney v. State, 391 S.E.2d 114, 115 (Ga. 1990); 
State v. Cox, No. 92WM000017, 1993 WL 65457, at *1 (Ohio. Ct. App. Mar. 12, 1993); State 
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well-supported than the majority’s opinion, even though it failed to pro-
tect Millis’ rights as a humanitarian.37 
II. The Similarities Between Millis and Charitable Efforts  
to Feed the Homeless 
 Millis faced a problem similar to one that individuals and charities 
feeding the homeless face every day: possible punishment solely for 
trying to provide basic human necessities to impoverished people.38 
Unlike in Millis, however, the negative effect that laws have on the pro-
vision of humanitarian aid to the homeless is typically not accidental, 
but intentional.39 Because homelessness can affect tourism, crime, pub-
lic safety, and the overall local economy, cities often try to enforce laws 
that minimize the indigent population’s visibility or even force the 
homeless to move elsewhere.40 Many cities create food sharing restric-
                                                                                                                      
 
v. Hood, 600 P.2d 636, 639 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979); State v. Couch, No. 2005AP1351, 2005 
WL 3116313, at *3 (Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 23, 2005). Although the cases he cited were not 
binding on the Ninth Circuit, Judge Bybee found them to be examples of how “[s]tates 
have summarily dismissed the argument that the terms ‘litter,’ ‘garbage,’ ‘waste,’ or ‘re-
fuse’ are too vague to pass constitutional muster.” Millis, 621 F.3d at 923 n.6 (Bybee, J., 
dissenting); see also Clayton, 492 So. 2d at 666–67; Sliney, 391 S.E.2d at 115; Cox, 1993 WL 
65457, at *1; Hood, 600 P.2d at 639; Couch, 2005 WL 3116313, at *3. 
37 See Millis, 621 F.3d at 918–24 (Bybee, J., dissenting). Judge Bybee provided several 
examples of cases where courts did not find the term “garbage” to be unreasonably vague. 
See id. at 921 & n.2, 923 & n.6; Sliney, 391 S.E.2d at 115; Cox, 1993 WL 65457, at *1. Judge 
Bybee further questioned the logic behind the majority’s holding by stating, 
[T]he majority would have the Service avoid using a term as common as 
“garbage” in its littering regulation. This is not what the rule of lenity re-
quires. The rule of lenity “cannot dictate an implausible interpretation of a 
statute, nor one at odds with the generally accepted contemporary meaning 
of a term.” 
Millis, 621 F.3d at 923 (Bybee, J., dissenting) (quoting Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 
596 (1990)). 
38 See Lay, supra note 6, at 743–47 (discussing the legality of a Las Vegas ordinance that 
prohibited providing indigent people with food in parks); Feeding Intolerance, supra note 4, at 
2; Homes Not Handcuffs: The Criminalization of Homelessness in U.S. Cities, Nat’l Law Center on 
Homelessness & Poverty & Nat’l Coalition for the Homeless, 9 ( July 2009), http:// 
www.nationalhomeless.org/publications/crimreport/crimreport_2009.pdf [hereinafter Homes 
Not Handcuffs] (discussing laws created to punish both the homeless and those who help 
them). 
39 See Lay, supra note 6, at 743–47; Feeding Intolerance, supra note 4, at 2; Homes Not 
Handcuffs, supra note 38, at 9. 
40 See Jason Leckerman, Comment, City of Brotherly Love?: Using the Fourteenth Amendment 
to Strike Down an Anti-Homeless Ordinance in Philadelphia, 3 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 540, 546 
(2001) (explaining that cities perceive the homeless as an obstacle to revival). Enforce-
ment of laws that remove the homeless is most severe during the tourist season. See Donald 
Saelinger, Note, Nowhere to Go: The Impacts of City Ordinances Criminalizing Homelessness, 13 
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tions in order to deter individuals from assisting the homeless, with the 
ultimate goal of keeping the homeless out of city parks and public ar-
eas.41 Unfortunately, these laws only increase hardships for individuals 
who are already in desperate need of assistance.42 Over the years, soci-
ety’s feelings of sympathy toward the homeless have ranged from indif-
ference, at best, to hostility, at worst.43 Many people feel those who are 
                                                                                                                      
 
Geo. J. on Poverty L. & Pol’y 545, 552 (2006). Examples of such heightened enforce-
ment include actions in Reno, Nevada before the annual increase in tourists, in New York 
City before the 2004 Republican National Convention, and in Little Rock, Arkansas before 
the opening of the Clinton Presidential Library. See id. During tourist season, homeless 
individuals go to the city parks and tourist attractions because these locations are where 
the most people are and thus where the homeless are more likely to receive money. See 
Leckerman, supra, at 541–42. 
41 See Homes Not Handcuffs, supra note 38, at 14–15. 
42 See Leckerman, supra note 40, at 546 (“Society’s economic and sociological shortcom-
ings help cause and perpetuate homelessness”); Saelinger, supra note 40, at 550 (“[B]y virtue 
of their diminished access to the opportunities enjoyed by the majority of society, upward 
economic and social mobility is extremely difficult for the street homeless.”). Many shelters 
lack beds, forcing the shelters to turn many people away and leaving those people with no 
choice but to sleep on the streets. See Hunger and Homelessness Survey: A Status Report on Hunger 
and Homelessness in America’s Cities, U.S. Conference of Mayors, 15 (Dec. 2008), http:// 
www.usmayors.org/pressreleases/documents/hungerhomelessnessreport_121208. pdf [here-
inafter Hunger and Homelessness Survey] (“[C]ities occasionally must turn away individuals and 
families seeking shelter.”); see also Homes Not Handcuffs, supra note 38, at 8–9. According to the 
U.S. Conference of Mayors, eighteen percent of the homeless population in the United 
States in 2007 lived on the streets. See Hunger and Homelessness Survey, supra, at 16. Sadly, this 
trend has continued unabated—the number of homeless men and women continues to rise, 
and the situation is only expected to worsen in light of the foreclosure crisis, a general rise in 
poverty, and high overall unemployment. See The Housing Crisis in Los Angeles and Responses to 
Preventing Foreclosures and Foreclosure Rescue Fraud: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Hous. and 
Cmty. Opportunity of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 111th Cong. 10 (2009) [hereinafter The Hous-
ing Crisis] (statement of Tanya Tull, President and Chief Executive Officer, Beyond Shelter). 
As a result of current economic conditions, an estimated 1.5 million additional people in 
California alone may become homeless over the next four years. Id. at 43 (statement of Caryn 
Becker, Policy Counsel, Center for Responsible Lending). At the 2008 U.S. Conference of 
Mayors, nineteen of the twenty-five cities surveyed reported an increase in homelessness and, 
on average, the cities reported a twelve percent increase. See Hunger and Homelessness Survey, 
supra, at 13. It is also estimated that at least 840,000 people are homeless on any given day 
and at least 2.5 to 3.5 million people will experience homelessness within a given year. Home-
lessness in the United States and the Human Right to Housing, Nat’l Law Center on Homeless-
ness & Poverty, at i ( Jan. 14, 2004), http://www.nlchp.org/content/pubs/Homelessness 
intheUSandRightstoHousing.pdf. Furthermore, one in every fifty children in America is 
homeless. Nat’l Ctr. on Family Homelessness, America’s Youngest Outcasts: State 
Report Card on Child Homelessness 15 (2009), available at http://www.homelesschil- 
drenamerica.org/pdf/rc_full_report.pdf. 
43 See Saelinger, supra note 40, at 545–46. One reason many people support anti-
nuisance laws or other laws that punish the behavior of homeless individuals is that people 
have become tired of caring about the issue. See id. at 545 n.5, 554 (referring to this prob-
lem as “compassion fatigue”); see also Gary Blasi, And We Are Not Seen: Ideological and Political 
Barriers to Understanding Homelessness, 37 Am. Behav. Scientist 563, 569–75 (1994) (study-
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homeless “choose” to be so.44 In addition, early efforts to provide 
homeless men and women with low-income housing and shelters have 
given way to efforts designed to keep the homeless out of the commu-
nity because of their effect on local businesses, crime, and property val-
ues.45 The measures cities take to remove the homeless include actions 
that both directly and indirectly affect the homeless.46 Measures or laws 
that directly punish the behavior of the homeless have drastically in-
creased in the last few years; these include anti-nuisance laws, laws that 
prohibit sleeping, sitting, or storing personal belongings in public 
spaces, and police sweeps of areas where the homeless generally live.47  
 The homeless are further burdened by laws with indirect effects—
for example, some cities have enacted food sharing restrictions that 
punish individuals and charities for trying to provide food to the home-
less.48 When cities or towns create food sharing restrictions in public 
                                                                                                                      
 
ing the drastic shift in the nature of New York Times articles about the homeless over the 
course of the 1980s). 
44 See Saelinger, supra note 40, at 558 (noting courts and the public are “increasingly 
skeptical of the ‘helplessness’ of the homeless”). In reality, homelessness often is not a 
choice, and homeless people with alcohol or drug problems or mental disorders are some-
times unable to receive the help they need. See id. at 549 n.43. The homeless population’s 
situation is self-perpetuating—they are frequently excluded from shelters or homeless 
programs because of their mental health or substance abuse disorders and they are often 
prevented from acceptance into substance abuse treatment or mental health programs 
because they are homeless. See id. 
45 See Deirdre Oakley, Housing Homeless People: Local Mobilization of Federal Resources to Fight 
NIMBYism, 24 J. Urb. Aff. 97, 98 (2002), available at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10. 
1111/1467-9906.00116/pdf (addressing the rise in “NIMBYism” —individuals claiming that 
homelessness is a problem that needs to be addressed but “not-in-my-backyard”); see also Sael-
inger, supra note 40, at 554–55 (discussing city efforts to make the homeless less visible). 
46 See Saelinger, supra note 40, at 550–53; Homes Not Handcuffs, supra note 38, at 9–10. 
47 See Homes Not Handcuffs, supra note 38, at 9–11. Comparing the 224 cities surveyed, 
there was a seven percent increase in public camping prohibitions, an eleven percent in-
crease in anti-public loitering laws, a six percent increase in anti-public begging laws, and a 
five percent increase in aggressive panhandling prohibitions. Id. at 10–11. Police sweeps in 
areas where homeless sleep is a tactic cities employ to “to drive them out of those areas, 
frequently resulting in the destruction of individuals’ personal property such as important 
personal documents and medication.” Id. at 10. Additionally, the homeless have been bur-
dened unfairly and disproportionately by more neutral laws—for example, open container 
laws, loitering laws, and public urination laws—because such laws are selectively enforced 
in areas with no public facilities. See id. 
48 See id. at 25. See generally Feeding Intolerance, supra note 4 (discussing the impact of 
food sharing restrictions and suggesting possible alternatives). Major cities that have re-
cently enacted or enforced food sharing restrictions that may, or already do, negatively 
impact an individual’s or charity’s ability to feed the homeless include the following: At-
lanta, Georgia; Baltimore, Maryland; Chattanooga, Tennessee; Cincinnati, Ohio; Dallas, 
Texas; Denver, Colorado; Fort Lauderdale, Florida; Fort Myers, Florida; Gainesville, Flor-
ida; Hempstead, New York; Jacksonville, Florida; Las Vegas, Nevada; Miami-Dade County, 
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spaces, homeless charities and individual humanitarians are prevented 
from best utilizing their finite resources to help the people most in 
need of their services.49 Similar to the scenario in Millis, charities or 
religious organizations that focus on providing basic goods need to go 
where their efforts can have the most significant impact.50 Most home-
less shelters lack the proper resources to feed all those seeking food.51 
Furthermore, many homeless must travel long distances to reach shel-
ters, or they may be unable to reach the shelters at all due to “work 
conflicts, illness, disability, or lack of adequate public transportation.”52 
If homeless charities and organizations are forbidden to provide food 
to the homeless in public spaces and parks because of ostensibly neu-
tral food sharing restrictions, they are unable to fulfill their humanitar-
ian mission.53 
 Nevertheless, many cities restrict efforts to serve the homeless in 
public places, thereby thwarting such humanitarian activities, for the 
purpose of preventing the homeless from remaining in the area.54 Pro-
ponents of these laws claim that sharing food with the homeless only 
enables them to remain homeless.55 Not only is this justification mis-
guided, but it is also flatly wrong.56 The cause of a person’s homeless-
ness is more likely tied to a lack of affordable housing, shelter space, 
available employment, services to help individuals with mental or physi-
cal illnesses, or substance abuse treatment services.57 Providing the 
homeless with easy access to food greatly increases their chances of sur-
vival and allows them to focus on what they need to do to improve their 
quality of life.58 Providing food does not promote homelessness.59 
                                                                                                                      
Florida; Orlando, Florida; Pinellas Park, Florida; Portland, Oregon; San Francisco, Cali-
fornia; Santa Monica, California; Sarasota, Florida; Tampa, Florida; West Palm Beach, Flor-
ida; and Wilmington, North Carolina. Feeding Intolerance, supra note 4, at 10–18. 
49 See Feeding Intolerance, supra note 4, at 6–7. 
50 See id. 
51 Id. The efforts of food pantries are impeded by the same problems shelters face be-
cause most homeless people lack the necessary kitchen equipment to cook the food and 
many pantries can only give away one package of food per person, per month. Id. at 6. 
52 Id. at 7. 
53 See id. (“Food sharing programs that reach out to those in public spaces may be the 
only way some homeless individuals can obtain healthy and safe food.”). 
54 See Feeding Intolerance, supra note 4, at 7. 
55 See id. 
56 See id. 
57 See id. 
58 See id. (“Depriving a person of food means that she must put all of her energy into 
obtaining food and less energy on improving other aspects of her life.”). 
59 See Feeding Intolerance, supra note 4, at 7. 
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III. The Unnecessary Burdens Millis Imposes on Efforts  
to Feed the Homeless 
 The Millis decision may make it even more difficult for charities 
and individuals to provide food or basic provisions to the homeless.60 
The Ninth Circuit’s opinion appears to reflect a desire to protect Mil-
lis’s actions without creating a precedent that might hinder the gov-
ernment’s ability to enforce other littering policies.61 Nevertheless, the 
decision may negatively, albeit indirectly, affect efforts to provide aid to 
the homeless in a number of ways.62 First, the decision focused on the 
ambiguity of the statute rather than the underlying constitutional rea-
sons for protecting Millis’s humanitarian activity.63 Second, the decision 
had a very narrow scope.64 Third, dicta indicated that Millis could have 
been charged under a clearer or more general regulation.65 Lastly, the 
decision went so far as to provide examples of the kind of regulations 
under which Millis could have been convicted.66 Although the decision 
ultimately overturned Millis’s conviction, it gave cities a blueprint for 
creating laws that punish individuals providing the homeless with basic 
human necessities, thereby arming cities with a weapon to wield against 
the homeless to keep them out of public spaces.67 
                                                                                                                      
 
60 See United States v. Millis, 621 F.3d 914, 918 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting that Millis’s con-
viction would be upheld if he had been cited for “abandonment of property or failure to 
obtain a special use permit” or charged under a more general littering policy). See generally 
Feeding Intolerance, supra note 4 (analyzing littering policies that restrict charitable efforts to 
feed the homeless); Homes Not Handcuffs, supra note 38 (discussing the problem of city-
enacted littering policies designed to burden the homeless). 
61 See Millis, 621 F.3d at 918 (declaring the court is only looking at a “narrow ques-
tion”). The court noted that Millis likely could be charged under a different regulation, 
but noted that such a question was not presented in the case. Id. “The only question [was] 
whether the rule of lenity should be applied to the offense charged.” Id. The court also 
stated that it was only considering the “narrow question . . . [of] whether the term ‘gar-
bage’ within the context of the regulation was sufficiently ambiguous.” Id. 
62 See id. at 916 n.2, 918; see also Feeding Intolerance, supra note 4, at 2–18 (discussing 
food sharing restrictions that burden humanitarian efforts with the homeless); Homes Not 
Handcuffs, supra note 38, at 9–10 (providing examples of ostensibly neutral laws that im-
pact homeless populations almost exclusively,). 
63 See Millis, 621 F.3d at 918. 
64 See id. The court noted that its decision did not extend to “any number of objects” 
that may be left in a refuge because “such items may well be prohibited by other regula-
tions applicable to refuge lands” and recognized that it would have no problem upholding 
Millis’s conviction if he were cited for violating a more general littering policy. See id. at 916 
n.2, 918 n.6. 
65 See id. at 918. 
66 See id. at 916 n.2, 918 n.6. 
67 See id. at 914–24; see also Feeding Intolerance, supra note 4, at 2–18 (discussing food 
sharing restrictions that burden humanitarian efforts with the homeless); Homes Not Hand-
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 Millis fails to protect humanitarian work because the majority de-
cided the case solely on the ambiguity of the regulation’s wording and 
not on Millis’s right to help those in need.68 During his bench trial, Mil-
lis admitted to placing the bottles of water in the refuge, but he testified 
that leaving the bottles of water out was an act of humanitarian aid and, 
consequently, not a crime.69 The majority implicitly refused to declare 
that humanitarian aid is a protected interest but it had no misgivings 
announcing it would have affirmed Millis’s conviction if the law were a 
general prohibition on littering.70 The court also stated, “Millis likely 
could have been charged under a different regulatory section, such as 
abandonment of property or failure to obtain a special use permit.”71 
Such dicta communicates to cities that as long as the language of a 
regulation is clear, it can be enforced against someone trying to provide 
aid to those in need.72 Judge Bybee went further in dissent, providing 
the exact wording of a regulation even the majority agreed it would 
have upheld.73 Therefore, although the court struck down part of a 
regulation that had the secondary effect of punishing humanitarian 
efforts, the decision will ultimately make it easier for cities to create 
similar regulations that intentionally punish humanitarian efforts like 
feeding the homeless.74 
                                                                                                                      
cuffs, supra note 38, at 9–10 (providing examples of ostensibly neutral laws that impact 
homeless populations almost exclusively). 
68 See Millis, 621 F.3d at 918 (focusing only on the rule of lenity issue and thus declin-
ing, implicitly, to address issues such as constitutional protection for humanitarian work as 
a form of expressive conduct). 
69 See id. at 916. 
70 See id. at 916 n.2. The court declared, 
We would have no problem affirming Millis’s conviction if, as [Judge By-
bee’s] dissent contends, § 27.94 prohibited littering in a wildlife refuge or 
disposing of or dumping garbage, refuse sewage, sludge, earth, rocks, or 
other debris. However, that is not the text of the regulation. Rather than gen-
erally prohibiting littering, § 27.94 governs Disposal of Waste. 
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
71 Id. at 918. In a footnote, the decision listed items that are either important or basic 
necessities that would be donated to homeless individuals, declaring that abandoning such 
items would be prohibited. See id. at 918 n.6 (“[W]e do not hold that ‘any number of ob-
jects (for example, sleeping bags, packaged food, clothing, flashlights, plastic bags, or 
shoes) can be left in the . . . refuge.’” (quoting Millis, 621 F.3d at 923 (Bybee, J., dissent-
ing))). 
72 See id. at 915–18. 
73 See Millis, 621 F.3d at 916 n.2; id. at 919 n.1 (Bybee, J., dissenting). 
74 See id. at 916 n.2, 918 (majority opinion); Lay, supra note 6, at 743–47; Feeding Intoler-
ance, supra note 4, at 5–6; Homes Not Handcuffs, supra note 38, at 9. 
2011] Limitations on Humanitarian Work with the Homeless 451 
IV. A Solution to the Millis Problem: Defining  
Humanitarian Aid as Free Speech 
 By defining Millis’s actions as expressive conduct—a form of 
speech entitled to First Amendment protection—the Ninth Circuit 
could have prevented its decision from burdening or altogether pre-
cluding other forms of charity and humanitarian aid.75 A reasonable 
observer would understand that Millis’s conduct was an expression of 
his dissatisfaction with the United States’ efforts to stop the dehydra-
tion deaths of migrants entering the country through the Arizona de-
serts.76 Concededly, 50 C.F.R. § 27.94(a) is a content-neutral regulation 
supported by an important governmental interest.77 The restriction, 
however, was broader than necessary with respect to the government’s 
interest.78 Additionally, the court could have explained how to word a 
less restrictive regulation that still managed to protect the government’s 
interest.79 The conduct of Millis and the other No More Deaths volun-
                                                                                                                      
 
75 See Islamic Am. Relief Agency v. Unidentified FBI Agents, 394 F. Supp. 2d 34, 51–54 
(D.D.C. 2005) (finding that charitable donations to an organization for humanitarian 
efforts constituted free speech even if the organization funded terrorism, but upholding 
an Executive Order restricting such donations because the order passed intermediate scru-
tiny); Lay, supra note 6, at 756 (arguing that feeding the homeless is speech because of the 
various political motives). 
76 See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989) (recognizing expressive conduct as 
free speech); Williams, supra note 14; Jones, supra note 14. Following the decision, Millis 
stated, “The day we change our federal border policies to show respect for human life is 
the day I’ll feel vindicated.” Williams, supra note 14. 
77 See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 624 (1994). A regulation is con-
tent-neutral if the legislative intent is neither to favor nor disfavor speech. See id. at 624. 
For a statute to be content-neutral, it must not restrict “either a particular viewpoint or any 
subject matter that may be discussed.” Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 723 (2000). Because 
the purpose of the regulation at issue in Millis was to prevent the disposal or abandonment 
of property in a wildlife refuge—that is, its aim was not to limit a particular viewpoint or 
subject matter—it could appropriately be considered content-neutral. See United States v. 
Millis, 621 F.3d 914, 918 (9th Cir. 2010). Also, given the imperiled status of the Buenos 
Aires National Wildlife Refuge and the government’s desire to prevent further degrada-
tion of the habitat, the regulation pursuant to which Millis’s citation was issued furthered 
an important governmental interest. See America’s Most Imperiled Refuges, supra note 20, at 
11–12. 
78 See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376–77 (1968) (holding that a content-
neutral regulation must be no more restrictive than necessary); Millis, 621 F.3d at 918 
(finding the purpose of the regulatory scheme was “to prevent the disposal or abandon-
ment of unauthorized property on refuge land” and “the structure of the regulatory 
scheme achieves that end in a number of ways”). The court found that 50 C.F.R. § 27.94(a) 
“was not intended to be a comprehensive implementation of the Congressional mandate 
to minimize human impact on wildlife refuges; rather, it formed part of a larger regulatory 
scheme.” Millis, 621 F.3d at 918. 
79 See O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 376–77; Millis, 621 F.3d at 918. Millis argued that the regula-
tion was not narrowly tailored because it did “not cover the dissemination of pure water in 
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teers communicated their dissatisfaction with U.S. immigration policies 
and their belief that those policies devalue human life.80 Although the 
bottles themselves did not indicate their purpose explicitly, a reason-
able observer aware of the problem of exposure deaths in Arizona—an 
issue that had made headlines across the nation—could infer the 
meaning of a series of unopened water bottles deliberately left along 
trails in the desert.81 Moreover, Millis communicated his affiliation with 
No More Deaths by openly displaying a “NoMoreDeaths.org” decal on 
the vehicle he used to distribute the water bottles.82 
 Similarly, the act of feeding the homeless in public spaces is a pro-
tected form of expressive conduct.83 Publicly feeding the homeless 
communicates to a reasonable observer, or the homeless individual be-
ing fed, that individuals should show compassion for those in need by 
providing them with basic human necessities.84 
 The government’s interests in protecting the federal wildlife ref-
uges or ensuring public safety and order may properly limit the right to 
free expression manifested in humanitarian efforts.85 For example, 50 
C.F.R. § 27.94(a) is a content-neutral regulation and its effect on Millis’s 
                                                                                                                      
sealed jugs for consumption by humans.” See United States v. Millis, No. CR 08-1211-TUC-
CKJ, 2009 WL 806731, at *4 (D. Ariz. Mar. 20, 2009), rev’d, 621 F.3d 914 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(citing Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 (1939)). Furthermore, Millis should not be 
cited for any water bottles that were found empty because the people who drank the bot-
tles were the actual litterers. See Schneider, 308 U.S. at 162 (finding that anti-littering ordi-
nances, which prohibit leaflet distribution, unconstitutionally infringe free speech rights 
because “[t]here are obvious methods of preventing littering” such as “the punishment of 
those who actually throw papers on the streets”). For the same reason, a charity that feeds 
the poor should not be cited for food left behind by a person the charity served. See id. 
80 See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
81 See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 404 (recognizing expressive conduct as free speech); Williams, 
supra note 14; Jones, supra note 14. See generally Maria Jimenez, Humanitarian Crisis: Migrant 
Deaths at the U.S.-Mexico Border, ACLU of San Diego & Imperial Counties & Mex’s Nat’l 
Commission of Hum. Rts. (Oct. 1, 2009), http://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/immigrants/ 
humanitariancrisisreport.pdf (referring to the problem of border-crossing deaths as a “hu-
manitarian crisis”). 
82 See Millis, 621 F.3d at 915 (“[Millis] also testified that he had raised the back window 
when [the officer] approached to make visible his ‘NoMoreDeaths.org’ decal.”). It can 
also be inferred that the bottles conveyed a message to the immigrants that at least some 
people were concerned for their well-being. See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410–
11 (1974) (per curiam) (recognizing “the expression of an idea through activity” if it is 
likely that those looking at the message would understand it). 
83 See Lay, supra note 6, at 753–58 (arguing that food sharing with the homeless is an 
expressive form of speech); Homes Not Handcuffs, supra note 38, at 25 (discussing the possi-
bility that courts might find food sharing restrictions infringe upon free speech rights). 
84 See Lay, supra note 6, at 756. 
85 See discussion supra Part I. 
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expression was incidental.86 Nevertheless, if conduct contains both 
speech and non-speech elements, even a content-neutral regulation 
must be struck down if the government’s interest can be achieved by less 
restrictive means.87 The regulation at issue in Millis, and city ordinances 
throughout the United States relating to littering or public health and 
safety, could achieve their purposes through less restrictive means.88 
 In addition, content-neutral regulations cannot unreasonably limit 
alternative avenues of communication.89 If individuals are prohibited 
from providing water directly to immigrants or giving food to the 
homeless in public places, then the individuals’ humanitarian messages 
have no practical significance.90 Regulations could be written less re-
                                                                                                                      
 
86 See O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 376 (finding that a law that incidentally limits free speech 
can be upheld if it protects “a sufficiently important governmental interest”); Disposal of 
Waste, 50 C.F.R. § 27.94(a) (2010). 
87 See O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377; see also Lay, supra note 6, at 747 (“When a course of con-
duct combines speech and non-speech elements, the state may justify incidental limitations 
on First Amendment freedoms supporting a sufficiently important government interest in 
regulating the non-speech element.”). The Court in United States v. O’Brien stated, 
[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitu-
tional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial go-
vernmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppres-
sion of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First 
Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of 
that interest. 
391 U.S. at 377. 
88 See Millis, 621 F.3d at 918 (finding that the intent of the regulatory scheme was to 
prevent the disposal or abandonment of property in a wildlife refuge); Millis, 2009 WL 
806731, at *4 (noting defendant’s argument, relying on Schneider v. New Jersey, that the 
regulation was not narrowly tailored); Williams, supra note 14 (stating that the court “also 
took note of Millis’ practice of removing empty water bottles he found while on his mis-
sions”). For example, 50 C.F.R. § 27.94(a) could distinguish between (1) those who intend 
to return and retrieve abandoned property but who have either failed to declare that in-
tent or have failed to retrieve the property within a reasonable period of time and (2) 
those who abandon property with no legitimate purpose and without an intent to return to 
retrieve the refuse. See Millis, 621 F.3d at 918. 
89 See Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984) (finding re-
strictions that infringe speech can only be valid if “they are justified without reference to 
the content of the regulated speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant 
governmental interest, and that they leave open ample alternative channels for communi-
cation of the information”). 
90 See Millis, 621 F.3d at 915. Millis’s actions were not unlike the actions of another or-
ganization, Humane Borders, to which the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service granted permis-
sion to leave drums of water on the refuge. See id. In fact, Millis’s more direct approach 
may have been more effective; the arresting officer in Millis testified that one of the drums 
was roughly two miles away. Id. Such a distance may have been too far or illegal immigrants 
may have been reluctant to travel to the drums out of fear of getting caught; moreover, 
these water stations have been systematically vandalized. See id.; Jimenez, supra note 81, at 
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strictively by providing for simple permit processes, requiring humani-
tarians to notify park rangers or city authorities of the locations of food 
or water dispensaries, and requiring the volunteers to return and re-
trieve leftover bottles or other refuse.91 These would not be unreason-
able restrictions on humanitarian conduct.92 
 Thus, prohibiting littering in wildlife refuges achieves governmen-
tal interests in the government’s interest in ensuring public health and 
safety while also preserving humanitarians’ fundamental right of ex-
pression.93 By recognizing Millis’s humanitarian efforts as expressive 
conduct protected by the First Amendment, the Ninth Circuit could 
have created a precedent that would not only protect the government’s 
legitimate interest, but also shield charitable efforts to help the home-
less.94 If the act of providing water to immigrants, and by analogy the 
act of feeding the homeless, were considered forms of free speech, 
regulations such as 50 C.F.R. § 27.94(a), as well as a significant number 
of food sharing restrictions, might be invalidated.95 
                                                                                                                      
 
39 (“[In late 2008], about 40 water stations were vandalized. Volunteers found cut flags, 
punctured water jugs and, in one case, a burned flag.”). 
91 See Millis, 621 F.3d at 915–16; Williams, supra note 14; Feeding Intolerance, supra note 
4, at 2–19. 
92 See Millis, 621 F.3d at 915–16; Williams, supra note 14; Feeding Intolerance, supra note 
4, at 2–19. 
93 See Millis, 621 F.3d at 914–15; see also O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377 (finding content-
neutral regulations that accidentally infringe on speech must be no more restrictive than 
necessary to further a substantial governmental interest); Schneider, 308 U.S. at 162 (strik-
ing down a littering regulation that restricted speech because it was more restrictive than 
necessary to achieve its purpose); Lay, supra note 6, at 753–58 (arguing that food sharing 
restrictions infringe on free speech). 
94 See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 404 (recognizing expressive conduct as free speech); Millis, 
621 F.3d at 914–15 (discussing the purpose of Millis’s actions); Williams, supra note 14; see 
also Lay, supra note 6, at 743–47 (arguing that the food sharing restriction in Las Vegas 
violated the O’Brien test); Feeding Intolerance, supra note 4, at 2–18 (discussing food sharing 
restrictions that burden humanitarian efforts with the homeless). 
95 See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 512 U.S. at 643. As the Supreme Court has noted, “[L]aws 
that by their terms distinguish favored speech from disfavored speech on the basis of the 
ideas or views expressed are content based,” and so laws targeting food sharing might well 
be considered content based and thus subject to a higher level of scrutiny. See id. Even if it 
were proven that the food sharing restrictions were, in fact, content-neutral, it seems un-
likely they would be upheld because they unreasonably limit the efforts to feed the home-
less and do not employ the least restrictive means. See Feeding Intolerance, supra note 4, at 7–
10, 18–19 (suggesting policy recommendations for cities to adopt in place of food sharing 
restrictions and discussing how “[f]ood sharing programs that reach out to those in public 
spaces may be the only way some homeless individuals can obtain healthy and safe food”). 
In addition, many anti-nuisance or begging statutes may be of dubious constitutionality. See 
Christine L. Bella & David L. Lopez, Note, Quality of Life—At What Price?: Constitutional 
Challenges to Laws Adversely Impacting the Homeless, 10 St. John’s J. Legal Comment. 89, 100 
(stating that restrictions that regulate begging must meet the content-neutral standard). 
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Conclusion 
 The Ninth Circuit in Millis could have protected both the humani-
tarian efforts at stake and the government’s interest in preserving na-
tional wildlife refuges if it had declared Millis’s actions to be expressive 
conduct protected by the First Amendment. Although the court over-
turned Millis’s conviction, its reasoning allowed for conviction on other 
grounds. Furthermore, the reasoning in Millis offers support for many 
cities’ food sharing restrictions—laws that unfairly restrict the work of 
individuals struggling to feed homeless men and women. If the court 
had decided Millis on free speech grounds by finding that 50 C.F.R. 
§ 27.94(a) was content-neutral but not the least restrictive means of ad-
vancing an important governmental interest, acts of humanitarian aid 
would be protected against unreasonable restrictions. Moreover, the 
majority would have overcome the criticisms found in Judge Bybee’s 
dissent. Although there was a favorable outcome in Millis, the court 
should have recognized that Millis’s effort to aid migrants was a pro-
tected exercise of free expression communicating his compassion for 
others and urging society to respect the value of human life. 
 
“The homeless have a strong interest in communicating their plight to the general public. 
Regulations that completely ban expressive conduct deprive a beggar of his or her ability 
to inform the public that economic and social conditions render it impossible for people 
to provide for themselves.” Id. at 99. 
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